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THROUGHOUT THE 1980s, Saudi Arabia experienced a period of relative fiscal 
austerity. Falling oil revenues forced a number of significant budgetary cutbacks. 
By early 1989, however, the situation had stabilized to the point where the Saudi 
Government announced that its 1989 budget would be equal to that of 1987 - 140 
million Saudi riyals. To many observers, this signalled a welcome end to the defla-
tionary effects of successive reductions in Government budgetary expenditure over 
the previous few years. In practice, it allowed Ministries to prepare sufficient pro-
jects for implementation, in the event that revenue constraints did not force cut-
backs during the year. I 
While most OPEC Countries were forced to introduce similar austerity pro-
grammes, little is known about how their Governments set priorities for their 
shrinking reviews between major expenditure categories. The purpose of this paper 
is to address this issue. In particular, we are interested in determining the manner in 
which, in light of revenue developments during the fiscal year, the Saudi Govern-
ment revised its allocation to the major budgetary categories. Did expenditure on 
certain categories vary systematically with unanticipated changes in revenue? If so, 
which sectors gained? Lost? Do these patterns provide insights as to the manner in 
which the Government established budgetary priorities during this period? 
Fiscal patterns 
Budgetary revenue and expenditure2 increased steadily up to 1974, except 
for 1967/68 when dislocation following the Arab-Israeli war affected all economies 
in the region. Nevertheless, the 1973n4 and 1979 oil price adjustments, world re-
cession, fluctuations in world demand for oil, and political instability and warfare 
in the Gulf have led to sizeable year-to-year fluctuations in budgetary receipts, 
compared with expectations. 
Although the general trend remained buoyant until 1981/82, in 1977 n8 and 
l 978n9 slight budget deficits followed unexpectedly low oil revenues, whereas 
expenditure and revenue both rose above projected amounts during the next two 
years. The 1982/83 budget was the first in which an absolute decline in revenue 
was projected, the objective being to arrive at a balance; while, in 1983/84, a 
planned deficit of SR35 billion was budgeted for the first time in recent history. 
The author is Professor, National Security Affairs, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Mon-
terey. California, United States. 
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Recent budgetary positions have shown increased volatility. In 1984/85, the 
planned deficit was increased to SR46 bn, with budget revenue and expenditure 
figures of SR214 bn and SR260 bn respectively. The 1985/86 budget was supposed 
to balance at SR200 bn, but ended up with a SR50 bn deficit. The 1986/87 budget 
was not published in March 1986 as scheduled, because of uncertain revenue fore-
casts. Monthly disbursements continued on the basis of average spending in 
1984/85. A new budget was finally released at the end of December 1986 to cover 
the 1987 calendar year. The projected revenue at this time was SR 117 bn. As a 
basis of reference, the budget for 1981/82 was for SR340 bn. 
Over the same period, the Government had reduced its spending from SR298 
bn to SR 160 bn, a significant achievement, but not enough to close the deficit gap. 
In 1988, another large budget deficit was projected, but the Government acknowl-
edged the dwindling size of its budget reserves by launching a local borrowing 
scheme to cover a substantial portion of the revenue shortfall. Import duties were 
also raised, in an attempt to generate more non-oil revenue, but other measures, 
such as tax increases, were rescinded following public protest. 
In addition to declining oil revenues, the Government has had to contend 
with a drop in overseas investment income, which has resulted from a fall in inter-
national interest rates and a reduction in the size of the Government's overseas as-
sets (from around $150 bn in 1982 to less (estimated) than $60 bn in 1988). This 
figure is not official, as the Saudi leadership has never released figures concerning 
the size and composition of it portfolio. 3 
One of the main problems for the Government is that current expenditure has 
proved very difficult to pare back; there are huge costs involved in running and 
maintaining the activities established by development project capital inputs - in 
social services as well as in physical infrastructure. Defence expenditure remains a 
major budget item. 
In terms of recently released figures, in 1986 (March-December), actual do-
mestic revenue was only SR16.5 bn, Government domestic spending was SR88.2 
bn, and Government direct foreign exchange spending was SR37.6 bn; central 
Government reserves continued to decline in 1987, and by the end of the year were 
approximately SR78 bn. This figure was down from SRI 18.5 bn at the end of 
1986. This SR40.5 bn drop probably reflects fairly accurately the actual size of the 
1987 budget deficit, against a budgeted SR52. 7 bn. If the budgeted 1988 deficit of 
SR36 bn had been fully financed from reserves, rather than borrowing, these Gov-
ernment deposits might have been halved by the end of 1988. 
The growing Government preoccupation with cutting its budget deficit is 
being translated into a number of schemes devised to tap the savings of state or-
ganizations (the pension fund has around SR60 bn) and the private sector. Expen-
diture rationalization and efficiency increases have also been initiated. 
Government bond issues are the most obvious example of attempts to tap 
sources of savings other than the Government's <1wn dwindling reserves, the more 
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so since various amendments to the offering tenns have been introduced. These 
changes have gradually widened the groups of potential end-investors. Before the 
bonds were even offered to banks, it is estimated that some SR14 bn may have 
been placed with the Government pension fund. The bonds were then offered to 
banks. In turn, a number of these institutions gained pennission to include the 
bonds in a package of national assets offered to private investors in the fonn of a 
unit trust. 
Finally, towards the end of September 1988, tile Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA) announced that banks would be able to sell the bonds directly to 
the Saudi public in minimum tranches of SRl million; purchasers would get acer-
tificate of purchase rather than the bonds themselves, as the banks would still col-
lect interest from them, and would be forbidden to sell them to non-Saudis. Finn 
details on the number and success of the bond offerings are sparse, however. 
The success of the Government borrowing programme will be judged not 
just by the levels of commercial bank and private sector subscriptions to each 
issue, but also by the extent to which these investors are prepared to repatriate their 
foreign asset holdings to purchase the bonds. As yet, there is no finn evidence to 
show whether the purchases are being financed from domestic or foreign savings. 
Figures published by SAMA4 provide several insights into the Country's 
current financial position. In the ten-month interval between budgets in 1986, di-
rect Government foreign exchange spending stood at SR37.6 bn, domestic spend-
ing at SR88.2 bn, domestic revenue at SR16.5 bn, and net domestic cash flows 
(defined as domestic spending minus domestic revenue) at SR71.7 bn. If the Gov-
ernment could cover its direct foreign exchange spending with foreign currency 
repatriated via the bond issues, it would mean that Government oil revenue and 
overseas investment income could all be put at the disposal of SAMA, to meet pri-
vate sector foreign exchange demand. 
On the other hand, if Government borrowings are to be covered by riyal sav-
ings, and could therefore be classified in the same vein as domestic revenue, it be-
comes clear that this method of borrowing will decrease the net domestic cash 
flow, along with the stimulus that the Government budget has traditionally given to 
the economy. This might be expected eventually to lead to less demand for foreign 
exchange throughout the economy, rather than to bring about an increase in foreign 
exchange availability. Funding the bond issues from domestic resources thus has a 
much clearer deflationary impact, which might be expected to hurt the independent 
growth of the private sector. 
More recently, the Gulf conflict has placed an additional strain on the Gov-
ernment's finances, despite higher oil production and, for a time, higher oil prices. 
In December, it was announced that the Government was paying out more for the 
war than it was receiving in extra oil revenue. As ~ result, its budgetary situation 
was deteriorating. The $13.5 bn cash pledge, made to the United States soon after 
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the war started, represented the type of drain on reserves that the Kingdom could 
have afforded over a year, but not all at once. To alleviate the problem, the King-
dom successfully raised its first commercial sovereign loan in February l 99 l. The 
overseas loan was for $3.5 bn, and was clearly the best option for the Government 
in meeting it's twin objectives of securing extra hard currency at short notice and 
minimizing disruption to the local economy. 5 
With the momentum of war gaining pace at the beginning of l 99 l, it was no 
surprise that the Saudi authorities decided to postpone publication of the annual 
budget, and to use the powers available to them to sanction expenditure on the 
basis of levels established in 1990. But delaying the budget also meant that the 
Government was deprived of an opportunity to adjust taxes, subsidies or the Gov-
ernment bond programme. The latter continues to run via fortnightly auctions of 
SRJ.5 bn ($400m). Budget breakdowns by the Ministry of Finance, however, indi-
cate that interest and repayment charges may now be running at around SR15 bn 
per year,6 reducing the net contribution that this borrowing is making to fund th~ 
Government's expenditure programme. 
Clearly, if oil revenues do not hold, the Government will experience great 
difficulty in raising sufficient funds to continue expenditure at recent levels. 
Composition of the budget 
As noted above, relatively little is known about how OPEC Governments 
make expenditure decisions over which programmes to cut back during periods of 
austerity. For non-OPEC countries, anecdotal evidence suggests that officials fol-
low rather ad hoc rules for making large contractions in a short period of time -
cutting new rather than on-going projects, ne,w rather than present employment, 
and materials and travel expenses rather than personnel; and favouring Ministries 
that are politically powerful, or reducing those that have expanded most rapidly in 
the past.7 
As to the choice of which sectors to cut back, it is often felt that some sectors 
are more 'vulnerable' than others. The defence sector, particularly, is usually con-
sidered difficult to reduce, while social sectors, such as health, education and rural 
development, are considered vulnerable. The alleged vulnerability of the social 
sectors in non-OPEC countries is clearly evident in World Bank documents: 
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In the difficult past few years, budgetary crises have often meant that 
social services were cut back, in the process unravelling carefully de-
signed programmes. 8 
Since many human development programmes are publicly funded, they 
are especially vulnerable when growth is thr~atened and budgets are 
under pressure. The recurrent costs of social programmes, especially 
salary cuts, tended to make them a permanent and, therefore, vulner-
able part of Government budgets.9 
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'Quick fix' relief through disproportionate cutbacks - in, for exam-
ple, education or rural development - may well have negative conse-
quences for the entire economy. IO 
Many member countries have had to reduce and reorient investment 
programmes to curtail recurrent expenditure and to delay the completion 
of high priority development projects. Programmes in health, educa-
tion and other social sectors have been particularly vulnerable. I I 
In the crisis situations confronting African Governments, education, 
training and health programmes are continuously in danger of becom-
ing the residual legatees both of resources and of attention by policy-
makers.12 
Despite these rather strongly held views, little empirical investigation has 
been made concerning the budgetary vulnerability of individual sectors. In the 
most comprehensive study to date, Hicks and Kubisch examined 37 cases of bud-
getary reductions. These were defined as occurring in countries were real expendi-
ture declined in one or more years. According to Hicks and Kubisch, a sector was 
defined as: 
l. Well protected, if expenditure on it was reduced by less than the percent-
age reduction in total expenditure. 
2. Vulnerable, if its percentage of reduction exceeded the average. 
In brief, a simple ratio of percentage changes in each sector's expenditure 
relative to total spending served as the measure of vulnerability. Where the ratio 
had a greater value than one, it indicated that the sector was highly vulnerable; a 
value between zero and one indicated low vulnerability, with less than proportional 
reductions in the relevant sector. A negative value indicated that, despite overall 
expenditure reductions, the sector was allowed to expand. 
Hicks and Kubisch 's main findings (table 1) indicated that the countries ex-
amined experienced an average decline of 13 per cent in real Government expendi-
ture. Associated with this decline was a contraction of only five per cent in the 
social sectors (producing a vulnerability index of 0.4). By contrast, the index was 
0.6 for the administrative/defence sectors and over one per cent for production and 
infrastructure. In short, the various social sectors were less vulnerable to cuts than 
defence and administration, which in tum were considerably less vulnerable than 
• 
production and infrastructure - contrary to the generally accepted view. 
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The fact that the social sectors and defence were both relatively well pro-
tected suggests that there were high political costs associated with reducing them. 
On the other hand, countries appeared to have been more willing to cut spending 
on infrastructure and production. The net result of this had adverse implications for 
longer-term growth prospects, but fewer early, direct and immediate political costs. 
These conditions were not very different for countries belonging to different 
income groups. The low-income countries appear to have afforded slightly more 
protection to the social sectors and production and slightly less to administration 
and defence, but the difference was marginal. The middle-income countries, by 
contrast, gave more protection to administration and defence and less to the pro-
ductive and infrastructural sectors. 
Table 1 
The impact of a reduction in Government expenditure 
Expenditure category 
Defence/ 
Social admin. Production Infrastructure Miscell. 
Average % change -5 -8 -11 -22 -7 
in real expenditure 
Index of 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.7 0.8 
vulnerability 
Low income 0.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.5 
Middle income 0.5 0.4 1.7 1.9 I.I 
Note: capital and recurring expenditure for 32 developing countries for various periods 
during 1972~0. 
Source: Norman Hicks and Anne Kubisch, "Cutting Government Expenditure in LDCs", 
Finance and Development (September 1984), p. 38. 
The apparent bias towards maintaining expenditure in the social services and 
defence may reflect the Government's preference for present consumption over in-
vestment and future consumption, since social sectors and defence typically have a 
heavy bias towards recurrent expenditure and, within these, there is a sizeable em-
ployment component. Since the social sectors and defence/administration are rela-
tively labour-intensive with high recurrent costs, reducing expenditure on them not 
only cuts back services valued highly by the public, but also causes relatively high 
unemployment per unit reduction. 
The manner in which the Government deals with austerity seems to hold up 
fairly well for the Saudi Arabian case. In recent years, all the major categories of 
the budget have been cut (table 2). Infrastructure spending, in particular, has been 
cut drastically, with few new projects commissioned. The budget for education and 
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health has also been cut, reflecting in part a decline in capital expenditure on new 
schools and hospitals. The wage bill for teachers, nurses and doctors continues to 
rise, however. Similar conditions arise with defence expenditure; even though the 
basic defence infrastructure is past its peak, the need to purchase new equipment 
and to maintain existing systems is still great.14 
In terms of specific allocations: 
1. Government lending institutions have experienced the greatest reduc-
tion in their allocations, declining by 51. 9 per cent over the 1983-88 
period, and with cutbacks accelerating to 67 .5 per cent for the more re-
cent 1985/88 period. 
2. After expanding at an average annual rate of 20.6 per cent over the per-
iod following the second oil price adjustment ( 1980-82), human 
Table 2 
Saudi Arabia: central Government budgetary expenditure, 1980-88 
billion Saudi riyals 
Average annual 
rate of growth 
% 
1980 1983 1985 1988 1980--83 198~8 1985-88 
Human resource 18.2 31.9 30.4 23.7 20.6 -5.8 -8.0 
development 
Transportation and 24.4 32.5 22.2 10.9 10.0 -6.1 -21.1 
communications 
Economic resource 14.9 22.0 12.5 5.9 13.9 -23.1 -22.l 
development 
Health 9.8 17.0 16.1 10.8 20.2 -8.7 -28.5 
Infrastructure 6.9 11.7 9.8 3.6 19.3 -21.0 -28.4 
Municipal 12.7 26.2 17.1 7.0 27.3 -23.3 -25.7 
services 
Defence 56.5 92.9 79.9 50.1 18.0 -11.6 -14.4 
Public administration 48.0 44.6 43.9 25.l -2.4 -10.9 -17.0 
Govt. lending 24.8 23.4 17.5 0.6 -1.9 -51.9 -67.5 
institutions 
Local subsidies 0.0 11.2 10.5 5.3 -13.9 -20.4 
Note: based on data from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
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resource development averaged reductions of 5.8 and 8.0 per cent per 
annum over the 1983-88 and 1985-88 periods respectively. It appears, 
however, that, of the major budgetary categories, human resource de-
velopment experienced the smallest cutbacks during the 1983-88 and 
1985-88 periods. 
3. Despite the common perception of their high priority, defence expendi-
ture contracted at the fairly rapid rate of l l.6 and 14.4 per cent per 
annum over the 1983-88 and 1985-88 periods. 
4. The same also applies to local subsidies, which declined at 13.9 and 
20.4 per cent per annum during the l 983-88 and l 985-88 periods re-
spectively. 
As a result of these differential rates of contraction, the relative shares of the 
major expenditure items have undergone a fairly large realignment (table 3). 
Table 3 
Saudi Arabia: composition of central Government budget, 1980-88 
percentage of central Government expenditure 
1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Human resource 8.5 8.8 10.7 11.7 12.3 14.8 16.6 
development 
Transportation and l l.3 11.9 9.6 8.5 7.2 6.8 6.7 
communications 
Economic resource 6.9 7.6 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.2 
development 
Health 4.6 4.6 5.2 6.2 6.4 7.0 7.7 
Infrastructure 3.1 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.7 2.5 
Municipal services 5.9 8.8 7.3 6.6 5.9 5.1 5.0 
Defence 26.l 27.7 29.0 30.7 32.0 34.0 35.5 
Public administration 22.2 14.4 18.2 16.9 19.8 19.4 17.8 
Govt. lending 11.5 8.3 7.7 6.7 4.7 2.2 0.4 
institutions 
Local subsidies 0.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.2 3.9 3.8 
Note: based on data from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report. various issues. 
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1. There has been a major increase in human resource development, from 
8.5 per cent of Government expenditure in 1980 to 16.6 per cent in 
1988. Again, this increase reflects more the contraction of human re-
source expenditure at a rate considerably less than that experienced by 
other major categories. 
2. Defence expenditure has maintained its dominant position, increasing 
from around 26 per cent of the budget in 1980 to more than 35 per cent 
by 1988. 
3. Government lending institutions have experienced a dramatic decline 
in importance, with their share of Government expenditure falling from 
more than 11 per cent in 1980 to less than half a per cent in 1988. 
4. Infrastructure expenditure in 1988 was about half its 1983 share. 
5. A similar percentage decline was experienced by transportation and 
communications. 
Human resource expenditure has enabled Saudi Arabia to achieve significant 
increases in both enrolment rates and teacher/student ratios. Although the Country 
lags somewhat behind comparable ones in terms of enrolment rates, it appears to 
be closing the gap fairly quickly. In addition, the pupil/teacher ratio is one of the 
lowest ones in the region.15 
On the other hand, the relatively low number of pupils reaching the sixth 
gradel6 indicates that a number of difficulties exist in terms of perhaps the quality 
of education received. It is clear that the Country has made great strides in its ef-
forts to increase its stock of human capital. But it is just as apparent that a great 
deal more needs to be accomplished. 
Operational definitions 
The evolving budgetary patterns examined above are suggestive of the man-
ner in which the Saudi Government sets priorities for its expenditure. Nevertheless, 
simple comparisons in the relative growth of budgetary allocations to individual 
sectors (or their share of the total), while suggestive, are not sufficient in and of 
themselves to infer the existence of any particular pattern of budgetary priority. 
These measures fail to capture the dynamics of the budgetary process. 
While the Government's fiscal position provides an insight into the public 
sector's budgetary priorities, a more sensitive (and indicative) indicator is the man-
ner in which the Government uses the deficits (Qible 4) to fund or reduce allo-
cations to certain budgetary categories. Three types of deficit are relevant: 
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Table 4 
Saudi Arabia: budgetary deficits, 1979-88 
%0/GDP 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Expected deficit 0.0 4.4 21.3 JO.I 0.0 10.0 14.7 0.0 19.1 12.7 
Actual deficit 6.6 -4.9 -21.3 -20.7 --0.3 . 6.8 14.3 18.6 32.1 24.7 
Unanticipated deficit 6.6 -8.8 -42.5 -30.2 --0.3 -3.2 -0.4 18.6 13.0 12.0 
Source: Computed from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Annual Report. various issues. 
Note: Government expenditure for 1987 is given as 137,422m riyals for the first ten months of the 
year. This figure was proportioned up to 164,906m riyals for a 12-month period. The same was 
done for revenue. The deficit is computed as expenditure minus revenue. Therefore a positive 
figure indicates a deficit has occurred. 
(a) Actual deficits. Those that actually occur during the budgetary period. 
Here, deficits are defined as the difference between Government expen-
diture and revenue. 17 
(b) Expected deficits. Those anticipated at the beginning of the fiscal year, 
i.e. the difference between anticipated expenditure and forecasted rev-
enue. 
(c) Unexpected deficits. Changes in the public sector's budgetary position, 
defined as the difference between the actual deficit in any year and the 
one that was expected to occur at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Here we assume that the expected deficit reflects a structural imbalance be-
tween revenue and expenditure. Similarly, transitory Government deficits are as-
sumed to be depicted by that component of the public deficit that was unexpected. 
Clearly, the basic assumption underlying these proxies is that the expected deficit 
represents an on-going budgetary process that moves slowly over time and cannot 
be changed very rapidly. 
Given the aversion of the Government to run deficits, 18 the relationship be-
tween a sector's budgetary share and the Government's fiscal position (revenue 
minus expenditure) in any year should be indicative of the priority accorded that 
sector. More specifically, the Government is willing to run deficits only for the pur-
pose of funding high-priority expenditure. The shares of these budgetary categories 
would therefore be expected to increase during periods of growing budgetary 
deficits. Similarly, their budgetary shares should decrease during periods of grow-
ing budgetary surplus - that is, during times when the Government has ample 
funds to allocate to lower-priority activities. 
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Incorporating these elements into a model of budgetary priorities (with ex-
pected signs for high-priority categories in parenthesis) yields: 
(A) Budgetary share= [DEFU, DEFA, DEFB, GOVEE] 
(+) (+) (-) (+) 
where: 
DEFU = the unexpected budgetary deficit 
DEFA = the actual budgetary deficit 
DEFB = the expected budgetary deficit 
GOVEE = expected Government expenditure. 
In terms of indices of budgetary priorities, we hypothesize that the unantici-
pated deficit should be the most indicative measure of the priority afforded a bud-
getary category. During the fiscal year, additiona~ (emergency) borrowing would 
only be likely to be used to assure the adequate funding of the Government's most 
important programmes. The actual deficit is less volatile, and therefore would be 
next in importance as an indicator of priority. The expected deficit provides an in-
itial benchmark measure of budgetary priorities. 
This form of prioritizing is consistent with (although not proof of) some form 
of lexicographic 19 ordering of budgetary priority. That is, the Government tries to 
maintain certain budgetary categories at pre-defined levels. When these levels are 
met, the authorities are then willing to provide additional funding for categories 
and programmes of lower priority. 
The expected level of Government expenditure was entered as a control vari-
able. That is, as the share of Government expenditure in gross domestic product in-
creases, certain budgetary categories tend to systematically have their budgetary 
shares increase. This is the so-called Wagner's Law20 effect, whereby countries al-
locate a higher proportion of their resources to certain public goods (usually de-
fence) with the general expansion of the Government in the economy. 
Results 
Because of the limited number of observations, the available degrees of free-
dom did not permit the estimation of the full model described in equation A above. 
Instead, a series of regressions was estimated, utilizing sets of two of the indepen-
dent variables. This method had the advantage of testing for the consistency and 
robustness of results - i.e. were the independent variables statistically significant 
across a number of alternative specifications? 
The main results are presented in tables A-1 through A-5 and summarized 
in table 5. They provide a number of important insights concerning Saudi Arabian 
budgetary priorities and, in particular, the importance afforded human capital for-
mation: 
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I. Human resource development and health and social development were the 
only budgetary categories to have their budgetary shares increase with expanded 
unanticipated deficits. They were also the only sectors to have their budgetary 
shares increase during periods of increased actual (realized) budgetary deficits. 
2. Human resource development and health did not have their budgetary 
shares expanded with increases in expected revenue. This finding is consistent with 
the notion that, because of their high priority, their funding levels were assured. 
Given this, marginal increases in revenue could be safely used by the authorities to 
fund lower-priority projects. 
3. The deficit-related expansion in human capital seems to have come in part 
at the expense of longer-term investment in economic capacity. Specifically, (a) 
transportation and communications, (b) economic services and (c) infrastructure all 
had their budgetary shares contract during periods of increased unexpected and ac-
tual deficits. This finding is consistent with the findings of Hicks and Kubisch 
noted above. 
In general, the main findings confirm the high priority granted human re-
source development by the Saudi authorities. Resources to this sector have been 
preserved relative to other sectors during the current period of austerity. Budgetary 
Table 5 
Saudi Arabia: fiscal budgetary impact (1979-88) 
Summary of main findings by budgetary category 
standardized regression coefficients 
Fiscal measure 
Unexpected Expected 
deficit deficit 
Human resource development + ins 
Health and social development + ins 
Transportation and communications ins 
Economic services ins 
Infrastructure ins 
Municipal services ins ins 
Defence ins ins 
Government lending ins 
Administration ins ins 
Subsidies ins ins 
Notes: Based on tables A-1 through A-5. 
+ = positive and consistently statistically significant at the 95 per cent level. 
- = negative and consistently statistically significant at the 95 per cent level. 
ins = insignificant at the 95 per cent level. • 
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Actual 
deficit 
+ 
+ 
Expected 
revenue 
ins 
ins 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ins + 
ins + 
+ 
ins ins 
ins ins 
OPEC Review 
cuts have occurred in Saudi Arabia, but education has been relatively spared. The 
long-term nature of the commitment by the Government to this sector is also evi-
denced by the fact that it appears relatively safe from budgetary cuts during per-
iods of budgetary deficit. In fact, deficits may owe their size to the authorities' 
commitment to provide adequate funding for these programmes. The same could 
be said for health and social expenditure. 
Conclusions 
While defence has retained its leading share of the budget during the recent 
period of relative fiscal austerity, Saudi Arabia does not appear to have fallen into 
the guns versus education syndrome. In fact, the two types of expenditure appear 
to complement each other in the minds of the Saudi budgetary authorities. 
Saudi Arabia appears firmly committed to its responsibility of providing edu-
cational opportunities to the majority of its citizens. There is little reason to believe 
this commitment will be sacrificed for the sake of maintaining foreign reserves. 
Apparently the Government takes a longer-term view, in which the rate of return 
on its citizens is higher than the financial return on its foreign savings. 
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Table A-1 
Saudi Arabia: fiscal budgetary impact (1979-88) 
Human resource development, health and social development 
standardized regression coefficients 
Fiscal measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected r2 F 
deficit deficit deficit revenue (adj) 
Human resource development 
(l) 0.74 0.732 22.9 
(3.81) 
(2) 0.99 0.36 0.805 17.5 
(4.88) ( 1.92) 
(3) -0.02 0.85 0.805 17.5 
(-0.12) (4.88) 
(4) 1.00 0.27 0.866 26.9 
(6.02) ( 1.66) 
(5) 0.72 -0.08 0.697 10.2 
(3.40) (-0.40) 
Health and social development 
(6) 0.67 0.495 8.8 
(2.55) 
(7) 0.74 0.11 0.501 3.9 
(2.15) (0.35) 
(8) -0.17 0.63 0.433 3.9 
(-0.63) (2.17) 
(9) 1.03 0.60 0.707 10.6 
(4.28) (2.58) 
(10) 0.72 0.24 0.480 4.7 
(2.63) (0.90) 
Notes: Equations are estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for 
serial correlation; r2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of de-
termination; Fis the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All variables 
are defined in terms of their percentage of total (actual) Government expenditure. 
The unexpected deficit is the difference between the actual deficit and that pro-
jected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected expenditure is that projected at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as expenditure minus rev-
enue. Positive numbers, therefore, signify that a larger deficit increases budgetary 
shares. • 
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Table A-2 
Saudi Arabia: fiscal budgetary impact (1979-88) 
Transportation and communications, economic services 
standardized regression coefficients 
Fiscal measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected r2 F 
deficit deficit deficit revenue (adj) 
Transportation and communications 
(1) --0.76 0.512 9.4 
(-3.29) 
(2) -1.08 --0.63 0.793 16.3 
(--0.01) (-3.24) 
(3) --0.20 --0.92 0.795 16.4 
(-1.25) (--0.01) 
(4) --0.63 0.41 0.894 34.7 
(-4.95) (3.03) 
(5) --0.57 0.61 0.919 46.2 
(-5.94) (6.14) 
Economic services 
(6 --0.80 0.554 10.9 
(-3.64) 
(7) -1.09 --0.60 0.811 18.1 
(--0.36) (-3.24) 
(8) --0.17 --0.92 . 0.813 18.2 
(-1.12) (--0.36) 
(9) --0.69 0.35 0.887 32.4 
(-5.09) (2.48) 
(10) --0.61 0.56 0.901 37.5 
(-5.67) (5.08) 
Notes: Equations are estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for 
serial correlation; r2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of de-
termination; F is the F-statistic; ( ) is the I-statistic of significance. All variables 
are defined in terms of their percentage of total (actual) Government expenditure. 
The unexpected deficit is the difference between the actual deficit and that pro-
jected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected expenditure is that projected at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as expenditure minus revenue. 
Positive numbers, therefore, signify that a larger deficit increases budgetary 
shares. 
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Table A-3 
Saudi Arabia: fiscal budgetary impact (1979-88) 
Transportation and communications, economic services 
standardized regression coefficients 
Fiscal measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected r2 F 
deficit deficit deficit expenditure (adj) 
Infrastructure 
(I) -0.66 0.484 8.5 
(-2.33) 
(2) -1.11 -0.57 0.699 10.3 
(-3.92) (-2.45) 
(3) -0.14 -0.94 0.700 16.5 
(-0.77) (-3.92) 
(4) 
-0.60 0.47 0.848 23.3 
(-3.19) (2.75) 
(5) 
-0.53 0.66 0.896 35.4 
(-4.20) (5.46) 
Municipal services 
(6) -0.42 0.295 4.3 
(-1.27) 
(7) -0.95 -0.70 0.616 7.4 
(-3.05) (-2.63) 
(8) -0.32 -0.81 0.615 7.4 
(-1.56) (-3.06) 
(9) 
-0.33 0.66 0.822 19.5 
(-1.64) (3.56) 
(10) -0.29 0.76 0.833 20.9 
(-1.80) (4.93) 
Notes: Equations are estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct 
for serial correlation; r2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient 
of determination; Fis the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All vari-
ables are defined in terms of their percentage of total (actual) Government expen-
diture. The unexpected deficit is the difference between the actual deficit and that 
projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected expenditure is that projected 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as expenditure minus rev-
enue. Positive numbers, therefore, signify that a larger deficit increases budgetary 
shares. 
148 OPEC Review 
TableA-4 
Saudi Arabia: fiscal budgetary impact (1979-88) 
Defence, Government lending 
standardized regression coefficients 
Fiscal measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected r2 F 
deficit deficit deficit revenue (adj) 
Defence 
(1) 0.45 0.166 2.6 
( 1.35) 
(2) 0.24 -0.33 0.171 1.6 
(0.59) (-0.83) 
(3) -0.42 0.20 0.127 1.7 
(-1.28) (0.59) 
(4) 0.90 1.00 0.761 13.7 
(4.23) (4.72) 
(5) 0.64 0.67 0.569 6.3 
(2.58) (2.75) 
Government lending 
(6) 
-0.59 0.221 3.3 
(-2.18) 
(7) -0.92 -0.77 0.679 9.5 
(-4.88) (-3.34) 
(8) -0.41 -0.78 0.681 9.6 
(-2.03) (-4.88) 
(9) -0.40 0.55 0.789 16.0 
(-2.76) (3.22) 
(10) -0.36 0.67 0.782 15.3 
(-2.75) (4.68) 
Notes: Equations are estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for 
serial correlation; r2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of 
determination; Fis the F-statistic; ()is the I-statistic of significance. All variables 
are defined in terms of their percentage of total (actual) Government expenditure. 
The unexpected deficit is the dijf erence between the actual deficit and that pro-
jected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected expenditure is that projected at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as expenditure minus rev-
enue. Positive numbers, therefore, signify that a larger deficit increases budgetary 
shares. 
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Table A-5 
Saudi Arabia: fiscal budgetary impact (1979-88) 
Administration, subsidies 
standardized regression coefficients 
Fiscal measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected r2 F 
deficit deficit deficit expenditure (adj) 
Administration 
(1) 0.37 0.530 10.0 
( 1.82) 
(2) 0.26 -0.24 0.506 5 .1 
(1.08) (-0.86) 
(3) -0.34 0.22 0.507 5.2 
(-1.36) ( 1.08) 
(4) 0.59 0.55 0.688 ' 9.8 
(3.07) (2.51) 
(5 0.49 0.34 0.624 7.7 
(2.54) ( 1.66) 
Subsidies 
(6 0.05 0.634 15.4 
(0.22) 
(7) -0.06 -0.09 0.591 6.8 
(-0.15) (-0.32) 
(8) 
-0.06 -0.05 0.597 6.8 
(-0.04) (-0.02) 
(9) 0.10 0.33 0.693 10.0 
(0.32) ( 1.48) 
(10) -0.06 0.32 0.692 10.0 
(-0.28) ( 1.57) 
Notes: Equations are estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for 
serial correlation; r2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of 
determination; Fis the F-statistic; ()is the t-statistic of significance. All variables 
are defined in terms of their percentage of total (actual) Government expenditure. 
The unexpected deficit is the difference between the actual deficit and that pro-
jected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected expenditure is that projected at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as expenditure minus rev-
enue. Positive numbers, therefore, signify that a larger deficit increases budgetary 
shares. 
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